The United States Is the Outlier
Among established democracies with independent judiciaries and strong rule of law, the United States stands virtually alone in granting supreme court justices lifetime appointments with no mandatory retirement age.
Every other comparable democracy has recognized what America refuses to acknowledge: unlimited judicial tenure concentrates too much power in too few hands for too long.
Germany limits constitutional court judges to 12-year terms. Canada requires supreme court justices to retire at age 75. The United Kingdom completely reformed its highest court in 2009 to create genuine separation of powers.
These aren’t authoritarian regimes limiting judicial independence. They’re democracies that have found ways to balance judicial independence with democratic accountability—something the United States has failed to achieve.
The lesson is clear: term limits, mandatory retirement ages, and regular turnover don’t threaten judicial independence. They protect democracy from judicial oligarchy.
The Global Standard: Limited Tenure
Germany: 12-Year Terms, No Renewal
The German Federal Constitutional Court is widely regarded as one of the world’s most respected judicial institutions. Judges serve a single 12-year term with no possibility of renewal and must retire at age 68.
How It Works:
- Constitutional court has 16 judges (two chambers of eight)
- Half elected by the Bundestag, half by the Bundesrat
- Requires two-thirds majority for selection
- Single 12-year term ensures regular turnover
- Mandatory retirement at 68 prevents lifetime tenure
Why It Matters:
- Regular appointments reduce politicization of individual selections
- Fixed terms mean no strategic retirement timing
- Judges can’t dominate the court for 30+ years
- Fresh perspectives and generational turnover occur naturally
The German model proves that limited terms don’t weaken judicial authority. Germany’s constitutional court has protected democracy, checked government overreach, and maintained public legitimacy while ensuring democratic accountability through term limits.
Canada: Mandatory Retirement at 75
Canadian Supreme Court justices must retire at age 75, ensuring regular turnover and preventing the gerontocracy that plagues the U.S. Supreme Court.
How It Works:
- Supreme Court has nine justices
- Appointed by the Prime Minister
- Mandatory retirement at age 75
- Average tenure: approximately 15-20 years
- Regular vacancies prevent extended periods without appointments
Why It Matters:
- Prevents justices from serving into their 80s or 90s
- Ensures predictable turnover and fresh perspectives
- Reduces politicization of strategic retirement timing
- Maintains court connection to contemporary society
Canada’s system demonstrates that mandatory retirement ages are perfectly compatible with judicial independence and constitutional review.
United Kingdom: Complete Structural Reform
In 2009, the UK abolished its centuries-old system where Law Lords (members of the House of Lords) served as the highest court. It created the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom with genuine separation of powers.
How It Works:
- Supreme Court established in 2009 as separate institution
- 12 justices, including one president and one deputy president
- Mandatory retirement at age 70 (raised from 75 in 2006)
- Justices appointed by independent commission, not politicians
- No longer members of legislature
Why It Matters: The UK recognized that having the same individuals serve as both legislators and judges violated separation of powers. The reform demonstrates that even nations with long-standing judicial traditions can modernize their systems to enhance independence and accountability.
France: Age Limits and Fixed Terms
French Constitutional Council members serve non-renewable nine-year terms, with one-third of the council renewed every three years.
How It Works:
- Nine members total
- One-third renewed every three years
- Single nine-year term, no renewal
- Mix of appointed members and ex-officio former presidents
- Regular, predictable turnover
Why It Matters: The staggered renewal system ensures continuity while preventing any single political moment from dominating the court for decades. No strategic retirement. No lifetime entrenchment.
Japan: Mandatory Retirement at 70
Japanese Supreme Court justices face mandatory retirement at age 70, ensuring regular turnover and preventing extended tenure.
How It Works:
- Supreme Court has 15 justices
- Mandatory retirement at 70
- Popular review every 10 years (justices appear on ballot)
- Average tenure: approximately 6 years
- Frequent turnover maintains judicial freshness
Why It Matters: Japan combines age limits with popular accountability (voters can remove justices at general elections). While the U.S. needn’t adopt popular elections, the mandatory retirement age prevents the problems of lifetime tenure.
Israel: Age-Based Retirement
Israeli Supreme Court justices must retire at age 70, with selection by a judicial appointments committee that balances judicial, political, and professional representation.
How It Works:
- Supreme Court has 15 justices
- Mandatory retirement at 70
- Selection by nine-member committee (judges, lawyers, politicians)
- Average tenure: 10-15 years
- Regular, predictable vacancies
Why It Matters: Israel’s system demonstrates that judicial independence coexists with mandatory retirement ages. Israeli courts are highly respected internationally despite—or because of—their term limits.
What These Systems Have in Common
Across democratic nations with strong judiciaries and robust constitutional review, certain patterns emerge:
1. Limited Tenure Is the Norm
Whether through:
- Fixed terms (Germany’s 12 years, France’s 9 years)
- Mandatory retirement ages (Canada’s 75, UK’s 70, Japan’s 70, Israel’s 70)
- Or both
…every major democracy except the United States limits how long judges serve on the highest court.
2. Regular Turnover Reduces Politicization
When appointments happen regularly and predictably:
- Individual vacancies matter less
- Strategic retirement timing becomes irrelevant
- Courts maintain connection to evolving society
- No single appointment dominates for 30+ years
3. Judicial Independence Survives—Even Thrives
Germany, Canada, the UK, France, Japan, and Israel all have:
- Strong judicial independence
- Robust constitutional review
- Courts respected for protecting rights
- Judges who aren’t afraid to check government power
Term limits and retirement ages don’t weaken independence. They prevent judicial oligarchy.
4. Public Legitimacy Remains High
Courts in these countries maintain public trust because:
- Regular turnover prevents entrenchment
- No single generation of judges dominates for decades
- Democratic accountability exists without compromising independence
- Courts stay connected to contemporary society
Why the United States Is Different (And Shouldn’t Be)
The Constitutional Text
Article III of the U.S. Constitution states that federal judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour”—interpreted as lifetime tenure.
But:
- The Founders didn’t envision justices serving 30-40 years
- Life expectancy in 1789 was far shorter
- The longest-serving early justice served 33 years; now justices routinely approach or exceed that
- “Good Behaviour” could be interpreted as allowing mandatory retirement ages
The Consequences of Lifetime Tenure
The U.S. system produces:
- Gerontocracy: Justices serving into their 80s and 90s
- Strategic retirement: Justices timing departures based on presidential politics
- Entrenchment: Individual justices dominating for 30+ years
- Lottery of death: Court composition dependent on which justices die during which presidencies
- Politicization: Every vacancy becomes a generational battle
What America Could Learn
If the United States adopted international norms, we could implement:
Option 1: 18-Year Terms (Most Proposed Reform)
- Regular appointments every two years
- Each president appoints two justices per term
- Reduces politicization of individual vacancies
- Ends strategic retirement
- Modeled on successful international systems
Option 2: Mandatory Retirement Age 70-75
- Aligns with Canada, UK, Japan, Israel models
- Ensures regular turnover without constitutional amendment
- Prevents justices serving until extreme old age
- Maintains lengthy tenure for judicial independence
Option 3: Both
- Combine term limits with retirement age
- Provides maximum accountability and turnover
- Balances independence with democratic connection
The Objections (And Why They Fail)
Objection 1: “The Constitution Requires Lifetime Tenure”
Response: The Constitution says judges serve “during good Behaviour,” not “for life.” Mandatory retirement ages don’t remove judges for bad behavior—they apply uniformly to all judges. Many constitutional scholars believe Congress could impose age limits by statute.
Objection 2: “Term Limits Would Undermine Judicial Independence”
Response: Germany, Canada, France, UK, Japan, and Israel all have:
- Robust judicial independence
- Strong constitutional courts
- Term limits or retirement ages
- Courts willing to check government power
If anything, regular turnover enhances legitimacy and prevents the political battles over individual vacancies that undermine U.S. judicial independence.
Objection 3: “Judges Need Long Tenure for Institutional Knowledge”
Response:
- Germany’s 12-year terms provide ample time for expertise
- Canada’s average 15-20 year tenures allow institutional memory
- France’s staggered nine-year terms ensure continuity
- The problem isn’t too little tenure—it’s too much
Objection 4: “American Exceptionalism Justifies Different System”
Response: American exceptionalism should mean we learn from successful democracies, not cling to failed systems. When every other democracy has recognized lifetime tenure is problematic, maybe we should listen.
The International Consensus
The global evidence is overwhelming:
Democracies with term limits or retirement ages:
- Germany
- Canada
- France
- United Kingdom
- Japan
- Israel
- South Africa
- Australia (70 retirement age)
- New Zealand
- South Korea
- And many others
Democracies with unlimited lifetime tenure:
- United States
- …that’s it
We’re not in good company. We’re alone.
How Reform Would Work in the U.S.
Drawing on international models, American reform could include:
Legislative Reform (No Amendment Required)
Congress could pass legislation:
- Establishing 18-year terms for new justices (transitioning current justices to senior status)
- Creating mandatory retirement age of 70-75
- Staggering appointments to occur every two years
- Defining “senior status” for justices who reach term limits (can serve on lower courts)
Constitutional Amendment (If Necessary)
If courts strike down statutory reforms, a constitutional amendment could:
- Explicitly establish 18-year terms
- Mandate retirement age
- Require staggered appointments
- Preserve judicial independence while ensuring accountability
The Benefits of Learning From International Models
Adopting term limits or retirement ages would:
1. Reduce Politicization
- Regular, predictable appointments
- Less significance to individual vacancies
- End to strategic retirement timing
- Decrease in partisan confirmation battles
2. Ensure Democratic Accountability
- Each president appoints justices during term
- No multi-decade droughts without appointments
- Court composition reflects evolving democratic preferences
- Reduces minority rule (justices from presidents who lost popular vote)
3. Maintain Judicial Independence
- Long enough terms for judges to rule freely
- Protection from political pressure during tenure
- Institutional stability through staggered transitions
- Proven model in other successful democracies
4. Increase Public Legitimacy
- Ends perception of Court as unaccountable oligarchy
- Maintains Court’s connection to contemporary society
- Reduces extremism (moderate judges more likely when individual appointments matter less)
- Builds public trust through regular renewal
Conclusion: America Should Stop Being the Outlier
Every other established democracy has recognized that unlimited judicial tenure creates more problems than it solves.
Germany’s 12-year terms don’t prevent its constitutional court from being highly respected. Canada’s mandatory retirement at 75 doesn’t undermine judicial independence. The UK’s complete structural reform enhanced separation of powers.
The international evidence is clear: term limits and retirement ages are compatible with—and enhance—judicial independence, constitutional review, and democratic accountability.
The United States can learn from these successful models. We can adopt 18-year terms like Germany’s model. We can mandate retirement ages like Canada’s system. We can ensure regular turnover and democratic accountability like France’s staggered appointments.
What we cannot do is continue pretending that lifetime tenure is necessary for judicial independence when every other democracy has proven otherwise.
The choice is clear: learn from international best practices or remain trapped in a system that produces gerontocracy, strategic retirement timing, partisan warfare over vacancies, and a Supreme Court disconnected from the society it governs.
International courts prove reform works. It’s time for America to join the rest of the democratic world.